Indo-US relations have seen a qualitative change since the end of the Cold War because of greater strategic convergence between the two countries. Bilateral cooperation has expanded to areas as wide ranging as defence, education, health and agriculture.
Indo-US relations have seen a qualitative change since the end of the Cold War because of greater strategic convergence between the two countries. Bilateral cooperation has expanded to areas as wide ranging as defence, education, health and agriculture.
In the year 2000, Prime Minster Atal Behari Vajpayee termed India and US as “natural allies” and thereafter civil-military cooperation between the two countries grew significantly. Defence cooperation has increased exponentially in the last few years and is testimony to the common interests and growing trust between India and the US. The US is one of the major suppliers of defence equipment and arms to India. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and India is today the US military’s biggest training partner. While India sees the US as a source of arms and technology, for the US, India is a significant market. India also feels the need to diversify its arms imports and the US is an obvious beneficiary of this. Further, given the strategic convergence
between the two and the increasingly common challenges they face, more interoperability between the two militaries is of mutual benefit.
To take the bilateral relationship to the next level, both countries need to shed traditional inhibitions. India has long followed the Non Alignment Policy, which initially served to keep a certain neutrality of engagements with both the poles during the Cold War. This default policy stance has been difficult to shed. The former Secretary of State of the US, John Foster Dulles, had said that nonalignment is “immoral” and ever since distrust of India has not disappeared from the bureaucracy in the US. There is no doubt that bureaucratic mindsets on both sides have to evolve further to deepen Indo-US strategic engagements.
Given the scope and potential, the pace of defence cooperation has not been as fast and as comprehensive as expected. This is because of several structural problems such as differences on dual-use technology, transfer of technology, the US government’s insistence on India signing the three foundation agreements (CISMOA, BECA and the LSA) and finally, India’s complex defence acquisition procedures. At the same time, defence acquisitions in India are prone to charges of corruption by the opposition. On defence acquisitions, if one goes only by the lowest bidder criteria, one cannot expect to get the best technology.
Moreover, it must be balanced with India’s own national security needs. The Indian defence acquisition procedures need to evolve for the sake of speedy modernisation of the armed forces. The bottom line is that India-US defence trade will increase if the price is right and within India’s means and if there is transfer of technology wherever possible.
Bold decisions in the defence arena can be taken only if they are driven topdown. The civilian nuclear deal came through so fast only because it was driven top-down with both President Bush and Condoleeza Rice taking an interest in the initiative. A top-down initiative is very important because if the leadership takes a broad view, it would lead to a realistic view of the needs of the country — strategic, security, etc. One of the problems with defence acquisitions from the US is that if India is ever engaged in a war, it cannot be sure that the US will not protest against India using the equipment supplied by it. This is the problem that needs to be factored in while procuring weapons and technology. The US government’s rules and regulations must be overhauled to improve the
relationship and for the US to take full advantage of India’s market.
The Indian government has had an overall favourable attitude towards Indo-US relations and vice versa. There is also a lot of cooperation going on in the military arena, particularly between the navies. Therefore, a strategic partnership between the two countries is feasible but it will take some time to mature and it will need an organic change in the sentiments in the bureaucracies of both the countries, driven by leadership and the will to cooperate. One word of caution: The Chinese are extremely worried about the growing Indo-US strategic partnership, which is necessary to safeguard our national security. But the closer India and the US come, the more hostile the Chinese attitude towards India would be. We have to be very alert to the Chinese hostility, especially on the
Line of Actual Control.
In the year 2000, Prime Minster Atal Behari Vajpayee termed India and US as “natural allies” and thereafter civil-military cooperation between the two countries grew significantly. Defence cooperation has increased exponentially in the last few years and is testimony to the common interests and growing trust between India and the US. The US is one of the major suppliers of defence equipment and arms to India. The two countries regularly conduct joint military exercises and India is today the US military’s biggest training partner. While India sees the US as a source of arms and technology, for the US, India is a significant market. India also feels the need to diversify its arms imports and the US is an obvious beneficiary of this. Further, given the strategic convergence
between the two and the increasingly common challenges they face, more interoperability between the two militaries is of mutual benefit.
To take the bilateral relationship to the next level, both countries need to shed traditional inhibitions. India has long followed the Non Alignment Policy, which initially served to keep a certain neutrality of engagements with both the poles during the Cold War. This default policy stance has been difficult to shed. The former Secretary of State of the US, John Foster Dulles, had said that nonalignment is “immoral” and ever since distrust of India has not disappeared from the bureaucracy in the US. There is no doubt that bureaucratic mindsets on both sides have to evolve further to deepen Indo-US strategic engagements.
Given the scope and potential, the pace of defence cooperation has not been as fast and as comprehensive as expected. This is because of several structural problems such as differences on dual-use technology, transfer of technology, the US government’s insistence on India signing the three foundation agreements (CISMOA, BECA and the LSA) and finally, India’s complex defence acquisition procedures. At the same time, defence acquisitions in India are prone to charges of corruption by the opposition. On defence acquisitions, if one goes only by the lowest bidder criteria, one cannot expect to get the best technology.
Moreover, it must be balanced with India’s own national security needs. The Indian defence acquisition procedures need to evolve for the sake of speedy modernisation of the armed forces. The bottom line is that India-US defence trade will increase if the price is right and within India’s means and if there is transfer of technology wherever possible.
Bold decisions in the defence arena can be taken only if they are driven topdown. The civilian nuclear deal came through so fast only because it was driven top-down with both President Bush and Condoleeza Rice taking an interest in the initiative. A top-down initiative is very important because if the leadership takes a broad view, it would lead to a realistic view of the needs of the country — strategic, security, etc. One of the problems with defence acquisitions from the US is that if India is ever engaged in a war, it cannot be sure that the US will not protest against India using the equipment supplied by it. This is the problem that needs to be factored in while procuring weapons and technology. The US government’s rules and regulations must be overhauled to improve the
relationship and for the US to take full advantage of India’s market.
The Indian government has had an overall favourable attitude towards Indo-US relations and vice versa. There is also a lot of cooperation going on in the military arena, particularly between the navies. Therefore, a strategic partnership between the two countries is feasible but it will take some time to mature and it will need an organic change in the sentiments in the bureaucracies of both the countries, driven by leadership and the will to cooperate. One word of caution: The Chinese are extremely worried about the growing Indo-US strategic partnership, which is necessary to safeguard our national security. But the closer India and the US come, the more hostile the Chinese attitude towards India would be. We have to be very alert to the Chinese hostility, especially on the
Line of Actual Control.
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